What is a "financial crisis"? In this paper, we introduce a new definition: a financial crisis is defined as a common econometric breakpoint in the characteristics of different forms of bankproduced money. We use this methodology to document the crisis of [2007][2008][2009]. The empirical chronology is based on locating the dates of structural breaks in panel data sets, based on the technique of Bai (2010). In contrast to ex post narrative chronologies, the econometric chronology is based on contemporaneous market prices, and reveals precise steps in the crisis prior to the Lehman collapse. *This paper was originally part of a paper entitled "The Flight from Maturity." We thank Jushan Bai for constructing confidence intervals for his estimation procedure. We also thank a number of market participants (who wish to remain anonymous) for providing data. For comments and suggestions on the original paper, "The Flight from Maturity," we thank Don
Introduction
Crises are chaotic. Understanding the dynamics of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 requires determining the timing of important events. Many crisis chronologies have been produced based on the announcement dates of government or central bank actions and on the dates of various other public events. These include chronologies have been assembled by newspapers and authors of books on the crisis, as well as those put together by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, among others. 1 We document the crisis chronology econometrically. Our dating procedure is fundamentally different because it is based on locating the dates of structural breaks in panel data sets of market prices (and repo haircuts), using the econometric methodology of Bai (2010) .
Our chronology dates the first structural break in panels of spreads on subprime-related instruments, to date the start of the crisis, and then the subsequent reactions of secured money market instruments (repo), unsecured money market instruments (e.g., asset-backed commercial paper), credit derivative (CDS) measures of the risk in financial firms, and finally, price-based measures of real economic activity.
We date the first breaks and also subsequent break dates. In this way we observe the evolution of the crisis based on the actions of market participants.
A chronology of the crisis is also very important because it allows us to formalize the concept of a financial crisis. What is a "crisis"? In this paper, we introduce a new definition: a financial crisis is defined as a common breakpoint in the characteristics of different forms of bank-produced money (i.e., repo and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)). 2 The financial system becomes insolvent because in a crisis short-term bank debt becomes suspect and banks are unable to satisfy demands for cash. Even the determination of whether an event is a crisis, and when it starts and ends, is based on governments'
actions and other publicly observed events because these are readily observable. Boyd, De Nicolò and 1 Examples of chronologies assembled by newspapers include that of The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/07/credit-crunch-boom-bust-timeline) and that of USA Today (http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/08/chronology-2008-financial-crisislehman/2779515/ ). CNBC has a chronology: http://www.cnbc.com/id/101019322#. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' chronology can be found at http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline and the Bank of England at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2009/fsrannex0906.pdf; and the European Central Bank Chronology is here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/crisis.en.html. Finally, many books on the crisis provide a chronology or have a narrative that follows events chronologically. Also, see Gorton (2010) and Wessel (2010) . Sprague (1910) provides chronologies for panics during the U.S. National Banking Era. 2 Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is commercial paper that is issued by conduits, which is a special purpose vehicle (a legal entity) that buys asset-backed securities, financing this by issuing commercial paper. See Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) and Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2011) . Loukoianova (2011) study the four leading classifications and dating of modern crisis events.
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show that for many crises the dating of the start and end dates differ quite significantly among different researchers. There is also some disagreement on which events are, in fact, crises. Further, they show that the start dates are late. 4 The dating of the start and the end of a crisis is largely based on contemporary accounts of the crisis, and there is ambiguity. We use daily price data to formalize the crisis dating for the events of [2007] [2008] [2009] and, in the process, understand crises.
Our approach allows for more precision on the start date, and also uncovers rich subsequent dynamics.
With respect to the concept of a crisis, an important finding is that the crisis starts with simultaneous breakpoints in the repo and asset-backed commercial paper markets, in July 2007. At the same time, the financial firms risk shows a break, as measured by their CDS spreads. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the spreads of non-mortgage asset-backed securities show a break. Another important finding is that between the start of the crisis and the Lehman failure, there are a number of other breakpoints in the money markets and in repo haircuts. The dynamics of the crisis leading up to Lehman suggest that during a crisis, fragility is building up. . Similar results have been found by Ó Gráda and White (2003) who study the panics of 1854 and 1857 based on the detailed records of the Emigrant Savings Bank in New York City. They show that these events were not characterized by immediate mass panic withdrawals from the bank. Depositors withdrew some, but not all of their money-akin to haircuts rising but not going to 100 percent. Later they withdrew more. Also see Kelly and Ó Gráda (2000) and Iyer and Puri (2012) .
The crisis can be seen in Figure 1 which shows (annualized) spreads (relative to the overnight index swap rate) on overnight loans. 5 The figure shows spreads for federal funds, general collateral repo (GC), four categories of commercial paper, and six categories of repo, differentiated by the nature of the collateral. 6 As shown in Figure 1 , low spreads on money market instruments prior to the breakpoint is consistent with money markets being integrated via arbitrage. The figure also shows the average spreads after the first breakpoint that we find. Note that during the crisis spreads do not become more highly correlated. Just the opposite, as market participants distinguish different degrees of moneyness among the different instruments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review money market instruments and present the data.
In Section 3 we analyze the spreads on money market instruments before and during the crisis. Section 4 begins with a brief summary of Bai's (2010) procedure. We then examine the data panels and find their breakpoints. We determine the date of the subprime shock, the date of the run on repo and ABCP, the subsequent runs on unsecured instruments. We also date the start of the real effects of the crisis.
We also date later breaks. Section 5 provides the overall chronology of the crisis and an associated discussion. Section 6 concludes.
The Money Markets
Money market instruments are short-term debt instruments and include U.S. Treasury bills and privately-produced instruments. Privately-produced money market instruments are short-term debt instruments that are liabilities of financial intermediaries. These were at the heart of the financial crisis, in particular asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and sale and repurchase agreements (repo). Money market instruments serve as short-term stores of value for financial and nonfinancial firms, and for investors, like pension funds, institutional money managers, hedge funds, and money market funds. In this section we briefly review the relevant money market instruments and introduce the data that we will subsequently analyze.
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A. Description of the Instruments
Privately-produced money market instruments include secured instruments and unsecured instruments that are backed by the issuer's portfolio of assets, usually in the form of a portfolio of bonds of a financial firm or of a managed special purpose vehicle. Repo is secured as it involves providing specific collateral to depositors who are lending money. The collateral might be government bonds (this is called "general collateral repo") or privately-created "high quality" bonds, such as asset-backed securities.
Depositors must agree with borrowers on the type of collateral and its market value, and then 7 We omit consideration of bankers' acceptances and wholesale certificates of deposit because we do not have daily data on their rates.
depositors/lenders take possession of the collateral. 8 There may be overcollateralization in the form of a haircut. If the counterparty fails, then the non-defaulting party can unilaterally terminate the transaction and sell the collateral (or keep the cash). This is because in the U.S. repo is carved out of the bankruptcy process.
"Unsecured" means that the short-term debt is backed by the issuer's portfolio, not specific bonds.
Although there is no specific collateral that the lender takes possession of, unsecured money issuers are screened; they must be high-quality so they can be viewed as near riskless. Commercial paper (CP) issuers are screened by investors and rating agencies. Only high quality financial and nonfinancial firms can issue CP. CP does not have explicit insurance or specific collateral, but access to the CP market is reserved for low-risk issuers with strong credit ratings. And CP is also backed up by a bank line of credit (see, e.g., Moody's (2003) , Nayar and Rozeff (1994) ). Hence CP issuers have very low default risk. If CP issuers deteriorate, there is "orderly exit." When a firm's credit quality drops, perhaps as indicated by its rating, it cannot issue new CP because investors will not buy it. The firm may instead draw on its bank line to pay off its maturing CP. This process of "orderly exit" from the commercial paper market maintains the high quality of the issuers. Because of the possibility of exit occurring firms must maintain back-up lines of credit. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits are a special type of CP issuer. Such a conduit is a special purpose vehicle (a legal entity) that buys asset-backed securities, financing this by issuing commercial paper. See Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) and Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2011) . The activities of ABCP conduits are circumscribed by their governing documents, and they are required to obtain high ratings. One important feature of asset-backed commercial paper is that the conduits must have back-up liquidity facilities in case they cannot renew issuance of their commercial paper. These liquidity facilities cover the inability of the conduits to roll CP for any reason. In most cases these facilities are sized to cover 100 percent of the face amount of outstanding CP. They are typically provided by banks rated at least as high as the rating of the CP. See Fitch (August 23, 2007) . Such a liquidity agreement is usable immediately if the commercial paper cannot be remarketed (rolled). If a conduit draws on its liquidity facility, the provider of the liquidity facility, usually the sponsoring bank, 8 The collateral is valued at market prices. During the period of the repo, there may be margin required to maintain the value of the collateral exactly. 9 "Orderly exit" is discussed by Fons and Kimball (1991) and Crabbe and Post (1994) . The back-up lines were introduced after the Penn Central failure led to a crisis in the CP market; see Calomiris (1989 Calomiris ( , 1994 and Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) .
purchases bonds from the conduit or loans money to the conduit to purchase commercial paper in the case that the commercial paper cannot be issued.
We also examine the two largest interbank money markets, the London interbank market (the "Eurodollar" or "LIBOR" market) and the U.S. federal funds market. In the LIBOR market banks deposit excess U.S. dollars with other banks, sometimes referred to as "Eurodollar deposits," and earn interest at the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). 10 The Eurodollar or LIBOR market involves large global banks, which are monitored by their domestic bank regulators. The LIBOR and federal funds markets are unsecured, but both rely on screening and monitoring by bank regulators.
B. Data
We analyze the following money market instrument categories: federal funds; LIBOR (Eurodollars);
general collateral repo (GC); four categories of commercial paper: A2/P2 nonfinancial, A1/P1 assetbacked commercial paper, A1/P1 financial, and A1/P1 nonfinancial; 11 and six categories of repo, which differ by the type of privately-produced collateral used as backing: AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa asset-backed securities (ABS), including auto loan-backed, credit card receivables-backed and student loan-backed ABS; residential mortgage-backed (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) with ratings between AA/Aa and AAA/Aaa; RMBS and CMBS with ratings below AA/Aa; AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa collateralized loan obligations (CLOs); AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa corporate bonds; and A/A-Baa/BBB+ corporate bonds. In addition, we use a number of other series to capture the state of the real economy, the state of the subprime market, and the state of the dealer banks (the old investment banks).
All the data series we use are listed in Table 1 . 12 The first four rows are series that describe the real sector of the economy: the VIX index, the S&P 500 index return, the JP Morgan high yield index, and the 
Money Market Instruments Before and During the Crisis
To what extent are the different money market instruments "money"? A simple way to look at this is to examine the spreads on money market instruments. Intuitively, money market instrument spreads should be low. But, they need not be the same if the degree of "moneyness" differs to some extent.
In examining spreads one issue that we must contend with is the presence of "seasonal effects" noted by previous researchers in some money market instruments and in commercial bank balance sheets. In this paper we are not focusing on these seasonal effects. 15 In Appendix A we examine money market spreads during normal times with regressions that include calendar dummies for "seasonals," that is quarter-end dummies, first, 15 th and last day of month dummies, and Monday and Friday dummies.
Appendix A Table A1 presents regression results of money market spreads on different calendar 13 Because of clientele effects, different tranches of the ABX index did not always move together. The ABX index is a product of Markit; see http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/structured-financeindices/abx/abx.page . Background on the ABX can be found in Fender and Scheicher (2008) . 14 A "broker-dealer" or "dealer" bank refers to a financial intermediary which is licensed the Securities and Exchange Commission to underwrite and trade securities on behalf of customers. Broker-dealers are regulated under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 Allen and Saunders (1992) found window dressing behavior by banks. In particular, they found that money market instruments were the important liabilities facilitating temporary upward movements in total assets. Kotomin and Winters (2006) found associated spikes in federal funds rates and federal fund rate standard deviations. Also, see Griffiths and Winters (2005) and Musto (1997). dummies. 16 The results in Table A1 show that "seasonals" are very important in the money markets.
Spreads increase quite significantly at various calendar dates. Table 2 presents the deseasonalized spreads, for different subsamples: prior to the crisis, during the crisis, and for three different stages of the crisis (corresponding to subsequently estimated breakpoints in the series). Table 2 allows us to see the relative ability of the private sector to produce "money."
( Figure 1 shows these deseasonalized spreads before and during the crisis.)
Focusing first on the period prior to the crisis, the following is clear. All spreads are less than 11 bps.
Also, note that the spreads on GC repo, A1/P1 financial CP, A1/P1 nonfinancial CP are significantly negative, that is they are below the target federal funds rate. Federal funds are unsecured, but banks are overseen by the Fed. GC repo is collateralized by U.S. Treasuries, so it is better collateral than federal funds, which is backed by a bank's portfolio. And, banks are examined, that is, screened. By screening issuers, the spreads on the highest quality CP are negative.
Relative to federal funds, it is hard for the private sector to replicate the moneyness of the best instruments. The other money market instruments are of lower quality in that the collateral is of lower quality or the issuers are of lower quality. Spreads on these categories are all positive, relative to the federal funds target rate. Finally, note that LIBOR is significantly higher than federal funds. Perhaps global banks are not screened as well as U.S. banks.
The categories with the highest spreads are repo backed by asset-backed securities with lower ratings and A2/P2 nonfinancial commercial paper. A2/P2 is the lowest (worst) rating for commercial paper and it had an average spread of 8.97 basis points. Also, repo which uses asset-backed securities (ABS), residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), or commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which have a rating below AA, had an average spread of 10.16 basis points. 17 After these two categories comes LIBOR with a spread of 5.33 basis points. Prior to the crisis LIBOR was widely believed to correspond to AA risk. Next is repo with the same collateral, but rated AA or higher, at 5.16 basis points, and collateralized loan obligations rated AA or higher which has the same spread.
What happened to the money markets in the crisis? We take as the crisis period the period following the first breakpoint in repo (discussed below). This is the column called "During the Crisis" in Table 2 .
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Note that money market instruments that are "high quality" show reduced spreads. These include federal funds, general collateral repo, and A1/P1 commercial paper, both financial and nonfinancial. As before, the table shows spreads calculated with regressions including the calendar dummies, like the previous results in Appendix Table A1 . To save space though these results are not included. 19 The spread for fed funds is the average difference between the effective fed funds rate and the target rate. first occurs around August 2007 and last until the second repo break. The second starts with the Lehman bankruptcy. As we saw before, in Table 2 , not all spreads widen. Spreads diverge as some instruments lose their moneyness (become risky) and others become a safe haven.
Understanding the Dynamics of the Crisis: A Chronology
I this section we turn to a formal statistical chronology of the recent financial crisis.
A. Breakpoints Methodology
To produce a chronology of the financial crisis we need to find random but common breakpoints in a panels. We estimate breakpoints in different panel data sets, where each panel has a recognizable economic meaning whereas most studies of breakpoints focus on a single series, treating series separately.
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For our study, basing the breakpoints on panel data is important. A definition of a financial crisis is that it is a common breakpoint in many money and banking time series at the same time. And a crisis is then followed by real effects. The econometric procedure formalizes this. Also, it is possible to consistently estimate breakpoints using a panel, while there may be little or no power to looking at individual time series when there is not much data covering the crisis regime. In other words, in a univariate setting there may be little hope of detecting a regime switch when a single observation that may be an outlier can have a large effect on the estimate, or when one regime consists of only a few observations in time. In our setting the crisis period is relatively short and comes at the end of the sample.
We follow the estimation approach of Bai (2010) . Briefly, the idea is to consider a panel of N series, as follows:
There is a large literature on change point estimation for univariate series and only a small but emerging literature on estimating common breakpoints in panel data. On breakpoint estimation in general, see Perron (2005) and Hansen (2001) . Bai (2010) provides the references to the other papers on the estimation of breakpoints in panels. i = 1,2, . . . , N where E(η it )=0 and var(η it )=1, and for each i, η it is a linear process; there are other assumptions as well; see Bai (2010) . The breakpoint, k 0 in means and variances is unknown. Consistent estimation requires that there are breakpoints in either the means or the variances (or both). Assuming a common breakpoint is more restrictive than assuming random breakpoints in the different series in the panel.
But, the assumption results in more precise estimation. The basic idea of Bai's approach is to exploit the cross-section information, sort of "borrowed power" relative to the non-panel approach.
The breakpoint is estimated with quasi-maximum likelihood (QML). Let
The QML objective function for series i is:
multiplied by one half. Analogously, for N series:
The breakpoint estimator is ̂= ( ). Bai (2010) Theorem 5.1 shows that the breakpoint in this case can be consistently estimated. 21 We next build on the chronology by looking at subsequent break points. 22 See Appendix B.
Our approach is to group the data series into five different panels with recognizable economic content:
(1) the real sector of the economy; (2) the subprime housing sector; (3) financial firms; (4) the unsecured 21 Note that we are not testing sudden breaks against the alternative hypothesis of gradual or smooth structural changes. Chen and Hong (2012) , for example, propose a test for smooth structural changes in time series, but not panels. The Bai procedure and the tests for smooth changes both test against the alternative of no change, and we cannot test to determine whether the change is sudden or gradual. 22 Bai (2010) : "Once the first break is obtained, we split the sample at the estimated break point, resulting in two subsamples. We then estimate a single break point in each of the subsamples, but only one of them is retained as our second estimator. The one that gives a larger reduction in the sum of squared residuals is kept." (p. 86) money markets; and (5) the secured money markets. We further divide the financial firms to consider including and excluding Lehman. We also consider subsets of the real sector and subprime.
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The real sector is represented by the S&P 500 index return, the VIX index (the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index), the JP Morgan High Yield Bond Index, and the Dow Jones CDX.IG index of investment grade credit derivative premia. The subprime sector is represented by the spreads on tranches of the ABX index (an index of derivative premia linked to subprime bonds), and two series of subprime bond spreads. The financial sector is represented by the CDS premia on ten banks, including
Lehman Brothers (see Table 1 ). Finally, there are the returns on thirteen money market instruments, including four categories of commercial paper, fed funds, LIBOR, and the rates on seven categories of repo, including general collateral. The returns on the money market instruments are annualized overnight returns. We split the money market instruments into secured (repo), unsecured, and GC repo.
Later, we also look at some individual money market series.
After the first breakpoint is found, the subsequent breakpoints in each panel are (almost always) during the crisis period. But, these breakpoints are not necessarily chronologically ordered. So, chronologically the second breakpoint may come after the third breakpoint. Appendix B provides more information on the ordering of the breakpoints using the Bai procedure versus the chronological ordering. In what follows we show the breakpoints chronologically. The issue of the order in which the breakpoints are found and the chronological ordering not matching is discussed later and in Appendix B.
B. Spreads
We first focus on spreads and ask how the crisis evolved. Gorton (2010) . 23 In terms of the number of series in a panel, precision is improved with a larger number of series. Clearly, the confidence intervals depend on N. But, as a practical matter N can also be small. Bai (2010) provides a sense of the precision with Monte Carlo experiments where the number of series, N, in the panel ranges from one to 100.
The next breakpoint occurs in the repo market on July 23, 2007. This is also when the breakpoint for the dealer banks' CDS occurs, whether we include Lehman or not. This is the start of the financial crisis, although as we will see subsequently haircuts do not rise until later. The breakpoints here confirm the start in the sense that the breakpoint for the repo spreads and for the dealer bank CDS premia is the same date. This is not surprising as the rise in repo spreads suggests that this form of financing is becoming riskier, raising the possibility of a run.
In untabulated results, we also looked at thirteen categories of non-mortgage ABS spreads. These 24 The banks included were Credit Agricole Group, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, Banco Santander, Lloyds, UBS, UnitCredit, Credit Suisse and Rabobank. 25 Keep in mind also that if a counterparty goes bankrupt, this does not affect ownership of the repo collateral, but CP holders must go into the bankruptcy process to try to recover their loan.
In Table 4 we look at two single series, as one might expect that ABCP and GC repo spreads to behave differently. Indeed, ABCP by itself shows a break July 27, 2007, and the 99 percent confidence interval overlaps with the first break for repo. This is consistent with the run on ABCP, which resulted in banks taking conduit assets back via liquidity facilities, and then financing this at least in part via repo. Also, note that when looking at GC repo as a single series, there is a break on August 13, 2007. This is likely the flight to quality by investors with cash since they did not roll their ABCP.
C. Repo Haircuts
In this subsection we look at repo haircuts. As discussed in Gorton (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2012) , increasing repo haircuts corresponds to withdrawing cash from the banking system. For example, suppose a lender in the repo market deposits $100 million overnight at interest. To keep the deposit safe the bank provides $100 million of bonds (valued at market prices). The depositor takes possession of these bonds. The next morning suppose the borrower wants to renew or roll the repo. If the lender is nervous, he may offer to lend $90 million but wants to keep the $100 million of bonds at collateral (getting $10 million dollars of cash back from the borrower). This is called a 10 percent haircut.
It corresponds to a withdrawal of $10 million from the bank because now the bank has to finance this amount from other sources. Table 5 shows the breakpoints in haircuts in the panel of the six categories of repo that use privatelyproduced collateral. The pattern of breakpoints in the haircuts is quite remarkable. The first repo haircut breakpoint occurs on October 23, 2007, after the breaks in the spreads in the first cluster.
The second breakpoint occurs on February 6, 2008, right around the time that the real effects of the crisis are felt. Not surprisingly, the third breakpoint is September 15, 2008, the day of Lehman's failure.
D. Financial Firms: Credit Derivative Premia
The break in repo spreads in July means that the short-term funding of dealer banks is under pressure.
How significant was this pressure and when was the onset? To examine this, the most relevant asset prices to look at are credit default swaps (CDS) referencing the dealer banks. We find that dealer bank spreads show a breakpoint at the same date that repo and ABCP show their first breaks. Gorton, Metrick and Xie (2015) who argue that this corresponds to a buildup of fragility during the crisis. This is also reflected in the CDS spreads.
The Crisis Chronology
Our findings are summarized in Figure 3 . Figure 3 lists (almost) all of the breakpoints discussed above, and also include some other major public events for reference to the other narrative. 
Conclusion
What do we learn from this econometric approach? First, in terms of what a crisis is, we find that not only repo and ABCP show breaks at the same time, but that coincident with this date, the credit derivative premia of the banks show a break. This suggests their problems were due to the deteriorating repo and ABCP markets. Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2011) argue short-term debt is useful for trading and storing value over short intervals because it is designed to immune to private information production by agents; it is information-insensitive. A "crisis" is a situation where lenders/depositors fear that they face adverse selection when using short term debt. This debt which was previously information-insensitive has become information-sensitive (i.e. due to a public signal some agents have an incentive to become privately informed about the collateral backing the bank debt.
In the case of repo and ABCP, the backing collateral was often non-mortgage asset-backed securities.
Consistent with Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2011), we find the break in the spreads on thirteen nonmortgage ABS at the same time as repo, ABCP, and financial firm CDS.
Second, we learn that the crisis involved subsequent dynamics shown by further breakpoints. This suggests that fragility was building up before the Lehman collapse, consistent with the shortening of maturities of money market instruments during the crisis, found by Gorton, Metrick and Xie (2015) . This suggests that systemic risk is endogenous and cannot necessarily be detected prior to the onset of a crisis
Appendix A: Seasonals in Money Market Spreads
In this appendix we briefly discuss the calendar effects or "seasonals" in money market spreads.
Appendix Table B1 shows regressions of the money markets spreads on calendar dummies, and shows that "seasonals" are important in money market spreads. There are spikes in many of the spreads at certain calendar dates. Just before the quarter end (five days before to the day before) and the date of the quarter-end and day after, show the largest increases. But, note that the largest increases on those dates are in the repo markets. Repo using all categories of private securities as collateral show significant spikes in spreads around the quarter-end. For example, repo that uses collateralized loan obligation tranches rates AA-AAA spikes by 77 basis points the day of the quarter-end and the next day.
Repo backed by asset-backed securities composed of auto loans, credit card receivables, or student loans rated AA-AAA also spikes by 71 basis points on those days. Unsecured money market instruments show much lower increases on those dates. For example, LIBOR goes up 4 basis points, A1/P1 Financial CP goes up by 8 basis points, and A1/P1 asset-backed commercial paper goes up by 9 basis points.
There is more seasonal pressure on repo markets. A seasonal increase in the spread in repo suggests that borrowers are willing to pay more for cash at these seasonal dates than at other dates to finance the collateral. But, the depositors/lenders, on the other hand, appear to want their cash (and not the collateral) at these dates.
Why is there a large demand for cash at these dates? Large movements of cash which go from one party to another, especially if one party is the government so cash leaves the economy, could cause these spikes in spreads. In the period before the Federal Reserve System there were seasonal spikes in interest rates when cash had to move from cities to rural areas for planting season and then later for harvesting season. Indeed, such spikes were viewed as creating fragility in the system and were a major motivation for the founding of the Federal Reserve System.
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In the modern era since the founding of the Federal Reserve System there are several possible candidates for explaining seasonals. One candidate for large cash movements is the payment of estimated taxes by corporations. Another possibility is quarter-end "window dressing," which might show up for example in the excess reserves of banks, if they are engaged in window dressing.
We examine these issues in Table B2. The table contains the intercepts on each money market instrument with no controls, in the first column, and also with the date dummies from Table B1 , in the second column. The next two columns show the change in the intercept when two tax variables are (separately) used in the panel regression. The two variables are the same. In both columns, we report the fitted values. We first estimate the parameters for tax flow process. Then we use the average tax flow to replace the actual tax flow and calculate the fitted value. For the variable "Tax, all days average", we assume tax flow equals the average tax flow across all days. For the variable "Tax, Normal days", we assume that tax flow equals the average tax flow across normal days, excluding quarter-end, beginning, middle and end of each month. The second average tax flow is smaller than the first one.
The last column includes U.S. commercial banks' excess reserves. The intercept is adjusted for these variables by estimating the coefficient on the variable and then adding or subtracting the coefficient times the average of that variable. So, for example, in column 3 the coefficient times the average inflow of taxes to the government, averaged over all (business) days, shows no effect, as the intercepts change very little. When the middle of the month is excluded, the intercept does go down in most cases, but not by much.
Inclusion of the excess reserves variable does reduce the intercept for repo categories, but not by as much as the calendar dummies that we started with.
These calendar effects are a subject for future research.
Appendix B: Chronology Breakpoints
In this appendix we briefly discuss the ordering of breakpoints.
As explained briefly in the main text, the Bai procedure finds a breakpoint for the given panel. The second breakpoint looks at the two subperiods defined by the first breakpoint and minimizes the sum of squared residuals over the whole sample using QML. The second breakpoint we find is usually after the date of the first breakpoint, but need not be. This means that we do not condition on the first breakpoint. In other words, the second breakpoint could be before the first breakpoint. Similarly, the third breakpoint is determined by looking at the ALL the subperiods determined by the first and second breakpoints.
The issues are illustrated by Figure C1 , which shows two possible Bai orderings. The first breakpoint in both panels, A and B, is the crisis date. This is true in the data. In Panel A, the first three breakpoints occur at the crisis date and then chronologically in order. But, breakpoint four is before the crisis date.
In general we are only interested in the first three breakpoints. However, we always calculate the fourth breakpoint because sometimes the ordering looks more like what is shown in Panel B.
In Panel B, the fourth breakpoint occurs during the crisis, and comes before the second breakpoint. But, the third breakpoint is before the crisis onset.
In order to understand the sensitivity of the procedure, particularly given the seasonals, we show the ordering according to the Bai algorithm and the chronological ordering. Table B1 provides examples for the most important panels. It illustrates the differences between the breakpoints found by the Bai algorithm and the chronological ordering of the breakpoints. In the table "Algorithm Order" equal 1 means that is the first breakpoint fund by the Bai procedure. "Chronological Order" means that after we found four breakpoints we sorted them chronologically and labeled them 1 through 4.
These issues are shown in Table C1 . Bai's (2010) procedure for different groups of data. Panel A shows the first breakpoints and the lower and upper bound of their 99% confidence intervals. The number of securities, the data frequency and the sample period for each group are also reported. Panel B shows the second and third breakpoints in the money market spreads data. Financial CDS include the 5-year credit default swaps (CDS) on 10 top U.S. financial institutions, including commercial banks and dealer banks. The list of banks is in Table 1 . CP includes four categories of commercial paper: A2/P2 nonfinancial, A1/P1 asset-backed commercial paper, A1/P1 financial, and A1/P1 nonfinancial. Repo include six categories of repo, which differ by the type of privately-produced collateral used as backing: AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa asset-backed securities (ABS), including residential mortgage-backed (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), RMBS and CMBS with ratings between AA and AAA , AAA/Aaa-A/A auto loan-backed, credit card receivables-backed and student loan-backed ABS, AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), AAA/Aaa-AA/Aa corporate bonds, and A/A-Baa/BBB+ corporate bonds. 
